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The Elephant in the Room:
Conduct, Groups, and Lawrence v. Texas
by ELLIOT WONG*
Justice John Paul Stevens, a World War II veteran who served in
Hawai'i, candidly admitted in a recent speech that upon seeing dozens of
Japanese tourists at the USS Arizona memorial, standing above the
thousands of dead American soldiers entombed therein, he had a strong,
emotional reaction.' It was his first visit back to Pearl Harbor since his
service there fifty years before, and he was unprepared for the extent of his
visceral response. The first thoughts that flashed through his mind were,
"[t]hose people don't really belong here. We won the war, they lost it. We
shouldn't allow them to celebrate their attack on Pearl Harbor even if it was
one of their greatest victories."2
Justice Stevens recounts that his outrage dissipated as he realized that
the Japanese visitors must have been experiencing conflicting emotions as
well, and that he was "drawing inferences about every member of the
tourist group that did not necessarily apply to any single one of them."3
Stevens' anger over an act that occurred on December 7, 1941, could not be
justifiably applied to those Japanese tourists; to hold the Japanese people
accountable for that infamous surprise attack just because they hailed from
the same country would mean illegitimately attributing an act with a
defining characteristic of a group. The broad, sweeping classifications he
was making, and the resulting instinctive reactions, were irrational and
unsustainable upon reflection.
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2008,
University of California, Davis, in Philosophy, Psychology, and Medieval Studies. I would like
to thank Professor Elizabeth Hillman, Robert Smith, Jocelyn Wolf, and especially Bill Wong and
Sarah Brann for their time and invaluable comments.
1. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at the National Japanese American Memorial
Foundation, 10th Anniversary Gala Celebration (April 3, 2012), http://njamf.com/jps%
20speech.pdf.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id.
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Justice Stevens subconsciously used conduct to define a group-
specifically, the attack on Pearl Harbor as a characteristic of Japanese
nationality-but then took a step back to realize that the relationship
between conduct and groups is not so simplistic. He cautioned against
allowing our negative feelings to dominate our perceptions and interactions
with different groups of people in our society, and has likewise opined
from the bench that it is impermissible for the state to prohibit conduct
because of the state's negative attitudes towards a group.4 In 2003, the
United States Supreme Court largely adopted this view in Lawrence v.
Texas.5 The Court found that a ban on homosexual sexual conduct had a
meaningful and negative effect on the lives of homosexualS6-an effect
significant enough to provide support that would ultimately help strike
down the ban on the underlying conduct.
Following Lawrence, courts and commentators alike have puzzled
over the potential impact of the Court's sweeping language.8  The
Lawrence holding rests in large part on the adverse effect it has on
homosexual persons.9 But what did Texas' unconstitutional law really
target? A group? Conduct? Or, are the two indistinguishable?
Substantive due process is concerned with protecting the right to engage in
certain conduct, but what role-if any-do groups play in how that conduct
is judged?
There are numerous groups that are inherently tied to (and defined
by) particular courses of conduct.o These conduct-defined groups exist
primarily as the collection of individuals who engage in a particular course
of conduct." However, the law does not always consider the effects on a
4. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . ."), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
6. Id. at 575.
7. Id. at 578.
8. See, e.g., John F. Basiak, Jr., Inconsistent Levels of Generality in the Characterization of
Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 16 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 401, 402 (2005) ("[Lawrence]
illustrate[s] that the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to provide the guidance necessary to advance
coherent decisionmaking in the lower federal courts .... ).
9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (The declaration of the immorality of homosexual conduct
"in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
and in the private spheres ... [and] demeans the lives of homosexual persons.").
10. The precise formulation of a conduct-defined group can be nuanced, taking into
consideration wrinkles such as disposition, cognition, identity, habitualness, and degree.
11. This relationship between conduct and group is overly simplistic; but for present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that while a conduct-defined group is based on a course of
conduct, it need not be based wholly on it. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING
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conduct-defined group when regulating its underlying conduct. Only
certain groups play a key, albeit often implicit, role in how their defining
conduct is judged. As the Lawrence decision illustrates, the Court remains
cognizant of adverse impacts on certain conduct-defined groups, but only a
small subset of all conduct-defined groups are actually given special
consideration. This leads one to ask: Where have we drawn the line?
This Note argues that the relationship between the group and
underlying conduct is the key to identifying conduct-defined groups that
should be afforded special consideration. The distinction is as follows:
Some groups evolve and exist beyond their defining conduct, while others
exist solely as a means of identifying individuals who engage in a course of
conduct. Groups that evolve receive special consideration by the Court,
while the rest do not. Turning to Lawrence, homosexuals had originally
been defined by reference to homosexual conduct, but by 2003, when the
Lawrence case reached the Court, the group had become conceptually
distinct from its defining conduct. Because the group had evolved in this
manner, the Court implicitly acknowledged that it was appropriate to
consider adverse impacts on the group when the Court weighed the
legitimacy of the state's ban on homosexual sexual conduct. While this
special consideration does not necessarily lead to invalidation of
restrictions on conduct, it is nonetheless an important factor that may
strongly favor invalidation.
Part I of this Note outlines the structure of rational-basis review within
the substantive due process framework. Particular attention will be paid to
the doctrine's efforts to protect conduct that implicates a liberty interest.
This background provides a foundation for the subsequent discussion on
the relationship between groups and conduct.
Part II addresses the treatment of conduct and groups in the Lawrence
opinion. The positions taken by the petitioner, respondent, and the Court
on this issue are particularly illuminating and provide compelling support
for the distinctions this Note makes between conduct and groups. Then,
Part II identifies the link that the Court makes between the regulation of
conduct and the treatment of conduct-defined groups.
Part III articulates why the adverse effect on homosexuals should
impact the regulation of homosexual conduct. Part III begins by separating
groups defined by a course of conduct into two separate categories. While
both are conduct-defined groups, differences among them result in
contrasting treatment. The distinction turns on whether the conduct-
defined group has become more than a mere label for individuals who
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 236-37 (1999) (arguing that homosexuals and other behavior-
based groups are based both on a mix of cognition and conduct).
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engage in a type of conduct. Groups that have are entitled to special
consideration, under which adverse effects on the group may be
considered. Groups that exist solely as a creature of the underlying conduct
are not.
In order to distinguish between these two categories of conduct-
defined groups, this Note identifies three principal features that suggest a
group has developed beyond the underlying conduct: A fundamental
understanding, a political voice, and a subculture and identity. The
remainder of Part III briefly summarizes the history of homosexuals as a
group, and concludes that at the time the Court considered Lawrence, the
group had evolved well beyond the label for people who engage in
homosexual conduct. Thus, the Court considered the adverse effects on
homosexuals as a group, which the Court ultimately relied on to support the
invalidation of the State's ban on conduct.
Part IV examines two other conduct-defined groups that have reached
the Court under substantive due process-hippies, and physicians who
assist with suicide-and distinguishes between those that exist beyond the
defining conduct, and those that do not.
Finally, this Note concludes by contouring the treatment of this
relationship between conduct and groups in a broader application. The
treatment of other conduct-defined groups under the Court's First
Amendment and Equal Protection jurisprudence will be briefly
summarized.
I. Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process, in its modern form, is employed as a tool to
protect a cluster of unenumerated, non-economic, personal interests' 2 from
governmental restrictions,13 and have been loosely conceptualized as
12. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The modern formation of the
substantive due process doctrine is conventionally distinguished from what has been termed the
"Lochner era," in which substantive due process was primarily used to protect economic rights
against state regulation. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (prohibition on
maximum hours bakery employees could work infringed the right to contract). However, it
should be noted that decisions protecting non-economic rights in the Lochner era were not
entirely absent. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (prohibition of teaching
German to children infringed individual liberty interests, which includes rights to "acquired
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
13. Substantive due process only protects rights against infringement by a governmental
actor, and cannot be used against infringement promulgated in the private sphere. DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (purpose of due process is "to
protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other").
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privacy, autonomy, or personhood-related rights.14 Government conduct
can be struck down under substantive due process because it either
impermissibly interferes with a fundamental right, is egregious enough to
"shock[] the conscience,"15 or is unsupported by a legitimate state interest
that is rationally related to the government's conduct.16
The first substantive due process analysis is commonly known as
"strict scrutiny,"' 7 and is employed to protect fundamental rights from
infringement.' 8 But, "fundamental right" is an elusive term. The Court has
used a general blueprint, under which it determines whether a right is
fundamental, except that the test has been described in a variety of ways,
and, as a result, the exact formulation is hard to articulate. The Court has
developed several permutations on how it defines a fundamental right:
[Fundamental rights are] rights that are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition," or "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental," or without which "neither
liberty or justice would exist," or whose deprivation would "violate
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions," or "those immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government."' 9
However difficult it is to pin down the exact formulation, the Court's
various descriptions do coalesce, and we are able to identify a common
focus. Broadly speaking, a right is fundamental only if an examination of
its history and tradition reveals qualities essential enough to necessitate
broad protection.
Governmental regulations which burden rights that lack fundamental
status are subject to a different channel for review. To categorize all
remaining substantive due process cases involving the infringement of a
non-fundamental right under a single heading would be a mistake, as there
14. Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural
Due Process, and the Bill ofRights, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 833, 838-39 (2003).
15. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
16. See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Emp't Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977) (declining to
strike down a statute on due-process and equal-protection grounds after applying rational-basis
review).
17. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 (1997) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
18. Id.
19. Rubin, supra note 14, at 841-42 (citations omitted).
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are at least two distinct methods employed under which these remaining
cases are analyzed: Rochin's "shocks the conscience" test and rational-
basis review.20
The prohibition against government conduct that shocks the
conscience can be traced back to Rochin v. California, a 1952 case in
which the Court held that certain government conduct was simply too
egregious to comport with due process.21 During a drug-related search of
his home, Rochin swallowed several capsules to prevent police from
obtaining them.22 The officers attempted to extract the capsules by force,
and after their efforts ended in failure, brought Rochin to a hospital and
forcibly extracted the capsules.2 3 After the capsules were recovered and
tested, Rochin was convicted of possessing a preparation of morphine in
violation of California law.24 The Rochin Court noted that the government
agents' attempt "to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities,"2 5 and employed methods ominously "close to the rack and
the screw." 26 Broadly speaking, governmental conduct that offends both "a
sense of justice" and "the community's sense of fair play and decency"
violates the enigmatic principle of due process of law.27
The last form of substantive due process can be roughly categorized as
rational-basis review. It explicitly emerged 28 in 1938 with United States v.
Carolene Products,29 which largely mirrors equal protection's rational-
basis review. Under the Carolene Court's formulation of rational-basis
review, the validity of the government's conduct or legislative enactment is
20. Professor Rubin argues that Rochin's "shocks the conscience" test would be more
properly categorized as a subset of strict scrutiny review, in that it involves "a fundamental right:
the right against conscience-shocking government behavior." Id. at 846; cf Donald A. Dripps, At
the Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a Real Due Process Test Should Replace the
Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 261 (1993) (arguing the Rochin
test is applied so narrowly that it protects nothing beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment).
However, for present purposes, it is sufficient that the Rochin test is distinguished from the final
category of rational-basis review.
21. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
22. Id at 166.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Id at 172.
26. Id
27. Id at 173.
28. Cf James M. McGoldrick, Katzenbach v. McClung: The Abandonment ofFederalism in
the Name ofRational Basis, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 6 n.21 (1999) ("Claiming that the rational basis
test begins with Carolene Products is true only in the sense that Carolene is a sign post case in
which the rational basis test eclipsed the historically parallel reasonable basis test.").
29. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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"presumed," and can only be invalidated following a showing that the
government's action "is of such a character as to preclude the assumption
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience
of the legislators."30
The modem formulation for rational-basis review is succinctly stated
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,3 1 and consists of three main
propositions.32 First, the challenged "legislation is presumed to be valid."3 3
The challenger bears the burden of proof to demonstrate
unconstitutionality. Second, the government must have a "legitimate state
interest" to enact the legislation.34 Finally, the legislation and the state's
interest must be "rationally related."35 Thus, it falls on the challenger to
prove the latter two elements are lacking. In order to mount a successful
challenge, it must be established that the government lacks either a
legitimate state interest, or that the state's interest lacks a rational
relationship to the government's conduct.
But rational-basis review is a fickle mistress, and Carolene's
formulation of the standard has since mutated into "two sets of rationality
cases, one deferential and one heightened, operating as if in parallel
universes with no connection between them." 3 6  This trend is hardly
unique; scholars and judges alike have criticized these systems of tiered
review for their tendency to continually spawn new deferential standards, 37
resulting in a doctrine that consists of something akin to a continuum rather
than tiers. 8  The late Justice Thurgood Marshall was particularly vocal
over the perceived failings of tiered review, and expressed concern over
"the danger, that . .. relevant factors will be misapplied or ignored."39
30. Id at 152-53 (citing Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935)).
31. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Although Cleburne
involved the application of rational-basis review, the challenge was brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause, not its due process provision.
32. Id. at 440 (applied equal protection rational-basis review and struck down a city




36. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 358 (1999).
37. From the "strictest" strict scrutiny, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), to
the "most minimal" rational-basis, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458.
38. See Rubin, supra, note 14, at 833-34; Neelum J. Wadhwani, Rational Reviews,
Irrational Results, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 801, 801 (2006); see also Interview by Professor Calvin
Massey with Justice Antonin Scalia, Senior Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, in S.F.,
California (Sept. 17, 2010), http://uchastings.edu/legally-speaking/scalia.html.
39. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Ultimately, Marshall concluded that "two fixed modes of analysis, strict
scrutiny and mere rationality, simply do not describe the inquiry the Court
has undertaken or should undertake ... ."40 In his view, a rigid two-tiered
framework fails to capture the sophistication of the proper inquiry: "All
interests not 'fundamental' . . . are not the same; and it is time for the Court
to drop the pretense that . .. they are."41
II. The Lawrence Decision
42In Lawrence, police responded to a reported weapons disturbance at
Lawrence's apartment, and upon entering found two adult men engaging in
a private and consensual sexual act.43 No weapons were found, but the two
men were arrested, held overnight, and convicted of violating a Texas law
barring "homosexual conduct," which specifically provided that it was
illegal for a person to "engage[] in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex."4
The Lawrence court begins its analysis with a discussion of the
development of the fundamental right to privacy, navigating its way from
an earlier and indistinct formulation of the right framed in broad terms45 to
Bowers v. Hardwick,46 a case in which the court declined to apply the right
of privacy to invalidate a similar Georgia sodomy statute.4 7 But the
Lawrence Court (arguably channeling Justice Marshall's criticism against
viewing fundamentality as a rigid dichotomy) criticized Bowers'
application of substantive due process, stating that by limiting its inquiry to
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy,""8 Bowers "fail[ed] to appreciate the
extent of the liberty interest at stake" in homosexual conduct. Indeed, after
rejecting homosexual conduct as a fundamental right, the Bowers Court
40. Id at 318.
41. Id at 321.
42. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
43. Id. at 562-63.
44. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003), invalidated by Lawrence, 539 U.S.
558.
45. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
46. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
47. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189-90.
48. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190).
958 (Vol. 39:4
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flippantly declined 4 9 to invalidate the Georgia statute under rational-basis
review in one brief paragraph.50
While the Lawrence Court seems to flirt with the possibility of finding
that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses private homosexual
conduct,51 it never makes the final leap. Rather than directly opine on the
fundamentality of the right at issue, 52 the Court turns its attention to the
nature of the state's interest in an implicit shift into rational-basis
analysis.53
It is Lawrence' s54 subsequent treatment of Texas Penal Code section
21.06 ("section 21.06") under rational-basis review that contains the
substance of the opinion. Recall the contours of rational-basis review-
legislation is held unconstitutional if the challenger can establish that there
is no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 5 While a showing
of the illegitimacy of the state's interest or the absence of a rational
relationship between the state's interest and the legislation is enough to
invalidate a statute, the Lawrence Court disposes of the case under the first
prong: Section 21.06's prohibition against homosexual conduct "furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual."5 6
The scope of the prohibition plays a crucial role, which bears close
examination. In its brief, Texas began to frame the scope of the case by
identifying the extent of the State's regulation.57 Texas's purported interest
was "the State's long-standing moral disapproval of homosexual conduct,
and the deterrence of such immoral sexual activity, particularly with regard
to the contemplated conduct of heterosexuals and bisexuals."s Texas
asserted that section 21.06 was within the state's authority to enact a statute
banning "an act," 59 which is "facially applicable to both persons of
49. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 150.
50. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
51. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66, 567-74 (examining the scope of the privacy right and
rejecting Bowers' analysis concerning a history and tradition condemning a right of private,
homosexual conduct).
52. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 575.
54. Id. at 573-79.
55. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
56. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
57. Id. at 3.




exclusively homosexual orientation and persons who regard themselves as
bisexual or heterosexual." 60  The state took a "hate the sin and not the
sinner" approach, and expended great pains to differentiate homosexual
conduct and homosexuals, stating that "[i]t is the homosexual conduct that
is viewed as immoral," 6  and arguing that section 21.06 makes no
classification on the basis of sexual orientation 62 by only criminalizing a
specified "course of conduct." 6 3
Consider the petitioners' alternative framing. Even though the Court
rejected the state's position, it did not wholeheartedly embrace the
petitioners' counterargument. The petitioners asserted that regulation of an
act was indistinguishable from regulation of the group of individuals who,
by definition, engaged in that act,6 explaining that "[t]he group targeted
and harmed by the Homosexual Conduct Law is, of course, gay people." 6 5
And, even though the petitioners acknowledged that the trial record was
devoid of any evidence of Lawrence and Garner's sexual orientations,66
they emphasized the homosexual relationship between the two and the role
67
of the relationship in defining individual identity and orientation.
The Court endorsed neither the state's proffered dichotomy, nor
petitioners' alternative of banishing the distinction altogether. Instead, the
Court concluded that the prohibition on conduct had a direct and substantial
effect on the individuals who engaged in the prohibited act.6 ' The
relationship between conduct and group is made explicit, but the distinction
is also nominally maintained: "When homosexual conduct is made criminal
by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres."69 In the Court's view, conduct and group remain
conceptually distinct, yet intimately associated.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id at 45-46.
62. If it were acknowledged that criminalization under section 21.06 was conditioned on the
"status" of the actor (i.e., his or her sexual orientation), the statute may be vulnerable to
invalidation under the Eight Amendment's cruel and usual punishment prohibition on "status
crimes." See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (California law struck down that
made it a crime for a person to be addicted to the use of narcotics).
63. Brief for Respondent, supra note 58, at 35.
64. Reply Brief at 2, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102); Brief for Petitioner at 32-33,
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
65. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 64, at 33.
66. Reply Brief, supra note 64, at 2.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
69. Id.
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We are left somewhere between the parties' two extremes. The
regulation of an act will certainly affect the group of individuals who
engage in the act, but regulation of a course of conduct is distinguishable
from an attack based on the status of the offending group. The Court
differentiates between conduct and the affected group using a cause-and-
effect relationship, which the Court posits in terms of a morally "justified"
restriction on conduct that results in social stigma directed towards the
group for having engaged in a criminal act. 70
It is difficult-if not impossible-to define homosexuals, bisexuals,
and heterosexuals without reference to sexual conduct. 71 After all, the
defining characteristic of homosexuality is homosexual conduct, or at least
the disposition to engage in homosexual conduct.72 The same can be said
for any grouping that is, at heart, based on conduct. But once we take into
account how we classify these groups, we encounter a problem. A
prohibition on conduct will always have a detrimental effect on the group
that is comprised of those who engage in the prohibited conduct, simply by
definition. Thus, we can see a chicken-and-the-egg problem begin to
emerge. A prohibition on homosexual conduct is invalidated in part
because of the detrimental effect it has on homosexuals, but the group
functionally exists as a collection of individuals who engage-or are
disposed to engage-in the conduct. If we are to follow this logic, the
distinction between conduct and groups begins to blur, if not vanish
entirely, and this tautology widens the scope of the Court's reasoning to
potentially reach any state-imposed prohibition on conduct.
It would be absurd to equate conduct-defined groups with their
underlying conduct and universally disapprove of all prohibitions on
conduct. This conclusion is precluded by the language of the Lawrence
decision itself; the Court does, in fact, maintain the distinction between
conduct and conduct-defined groups. How far, then, does the Court's
reasoning extend? The remainder of this Note will attempt to articulate a
solution. As we shall see, this problem provides the key to clarifying the
scope of Lawrence's holding and identifies when special concern will be
shown towards a conduct-defined group.
70. Id.
71. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 172. See, e.g., Reply Brief, supra note 64, at 33 (citing
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996)) (defining sexual orientation as the disposition or
decision of which gender to engage in sexual acts with).
72. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 71 ("Homosexual identity is defined by presumptions about
homosexual conduct.").
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III. Evaluating Homosexuals as a Conduct-Defined Group
While there can be no question that homosexual sexual acts are a
defining characteristic of homosexuality, we must ask: Is there more to the
grouping than a course of sexual conduct? If a group is distinguishable
from its defining conduct, then (1) an intimate relationship between group
and conduct is preserved, and (2) the Lawrence concern will be judiciously
reserved for a deserving subset of conduct-defined groups.
Following Lawrence, a principled distinction has arisen. Where a
conduct-defined group arises from associated conduct, courts should not
normally consider adverse effects on the group. However, courts should
consider adverse effects on a conduct-defined group when the group has
developed to a point where it is conceptually distinct from the underlying
conduct. If so, the group becomes more like an independent social
classification, rather than a mere label for participating in a course of
conduct. Regarding homosexuals, the answer seems clear. While
homosexuals may be identified by homosexual conduct, the group has
evolved beyond the original identifying course of conduct into a full-
fledged component of society.
Three principal features that, when all are present, indicate that a
group exists beyond the defining course of conduct: (1) a fundamental
understanding of the group, (2) the development of the group's political
voice, and (3) the emergence of the group's subculture and identity. These
three features are rough categories that capture the most salient concerns
expressed by the Court when evaluating the relationship between conduct
and groups. Even though these features should be kept conceptually
distinct, they occasionally overlap. The remainder of Part III analyzes
these three features with respect to homosexuals, and demonstrates that, as
a conduct-defined group, homosexuals exist apart from a course of
underlying homosexual conduct.
A. A Fundamental Understanding
We begin with society's basic understanding of the group. This
element is meant to capture our understanding of the underlying behaviors,
causes, and individuals who engage in the conduct. The inquiry will often
involve an interdisciplinary inquiry, relying on a mix of psychology,
sociology, biology, and history. The way in which we understand the
individuals who engage in a course of conduct is indicative of how we
judge the underlying association between the conduct and the individuals.
It also may bear on the group's attributed mens rea, likely treatment by
society at large, and level of ostracism or acceptance. In short, it provides a
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useful litmus test for judging the level of conceptual separation between
group and conduct.
The Lawrence Court notes that "homosexual[s] as a distinct category
of person[s] did not emerge until the late 19th century,"7 and that the
modem grouping "d[id] not apply to an era that had not yet articulated [the
distinction between homosexuality and heterosexuality]."74 Roughly
contemporaneous with the identification of the group was a "concerted
scientific investigation" into homosexuality. And, even though any
scientific understanding was only in its infant stages, a sharp divide quickly
emerged between "those who saw [homosexuality] as an acquired
characteristic and those who viewed it as inborn."76 In this early period,
the school of thought that viewed homosexuality as an inborn characteristic
dominated its rival, despite general contemporary tendencies to assign
culpability to the free will of an individual. Even so, the basic
understanding of homosexuality was extremely crude, as "[n]ewly
discovered facts did little to frame the understanding of homosexuality"
because "it was the perspective on homosexuality that determined the
meaning of those facts."78 Many theories viewed homosexuality as a
"profound deviation from the normal pattern of human sexuality."7 9
It was not until the twentieth century that any major conceptual shifts
occurred in the way homosexuality was understood. Importantly,
psychoanalysts-including Freud himself at the turn of the century-began
viewing homosexuality as a normal end of psychosexual development
rather than a pathological congenital degeneration, distancing
homosexuality from a willful (and hence individually culpable) deviation
from sexual norms.8 0 After the waning of the psychoanalysts' influence in
the middle of the twentieth century, however, homosexuals were almost
uniformly viewed as a group suffering from a pathological condition.8' In
the American Psychiatric Association's first publication of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual ("DSM"), a comprehensive compendium of mental
73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568.
74. Id (quoting J. D'EMItLo & E. FREEDMAN, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in
America 121 (2d ed. 1997)).




78. Id. at 21.
79. Id. at 20.
80. Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Incorporation and Cinematic Reflections ofPsychological
Conceptions ofHomosexuality, 70 UMKC L. REV. 495, 509 (2002).
81. BAYER, supra note 75, at 38.
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disorders, homosexuality was listed as a sociopathic personality
disturbance.8 2
The psychiatric perspective was first challenged by Alfred Kinsey in
1948,83 and again by Clellan Ford and Frank Beach three years later.84
Kinsey examined sexual conduct of American males and discovered sexual
behavior existed along a continuum-not in a strict dichotomy of homo-
and heterosexuality.8 5  Ford and Beach investigated both cross-cultural
practices as well as non-human primates, and concluded that homosexual
conduct was part of our "fundamental mammalian heritage."86  They
87
explicitly rejected the universality of orthodox American sexual norms.
Then in 1957, a study by Evelyn Hooker compared homo- and heterosexual
men, and concluded that there was no correlation between sexual
orientation and social determinism of sexuality.
As more research came to light,89 the pathological status that
homosexuality had acquired was ultimately abandoned by the American
Psychiatric Association in the third edition of the DSM (following a
protracted debate within the psychiatric community). 90 Other communities
of mental health experts have similarly come to the consensus that research
has demonstrated that homosexuality is a normal variation of human
sexuality.91
More recently, evidence has emerged to support the theory that sexual
orientation is "more acontextual than other features of one's personality."9 2
82. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Mental Disorders 34
(1952).
83. ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948).
84. CLELLAN S. FORD & FRANK A. BEACH, Patterns of Sexual Behavior (1951).
85. KINSEY ET AL., supra note 83, at 638.
86. FORD & BEACH, supra note 84, at 259.
87. Id.
88. Evelyn Hooker, The Adjustment of the Male Overt Homosexual, 21 J. PROJECTIVE
TECHNIQUES 18-31 (1957).
89. See BAYER, supra note 75, at 10 1-54.
90. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, DSM-III (1980).
91. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL
ORIENTATION (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/
resources/therapeutic-response.pdf; ROYAL COLL. OF PSYCHIATRISTS, SUBMISSION TO THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND'S LISTENING EXERCISE ON HUMAN SEXUALITY (2007), available at
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/Submission%20to%20the%2Church%20of/
20England.pdf. Cf STANTON L. JONES & MARK A. YARHOUSE, Homosexuality: The Use of
Scientific Research in the Church's Moral Debate (2000) (arguing that while homosexuality is no
longer a mental illness, whether or not it is a psychopathology should be viewed as an unsettled
question).
92. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 284-85.
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The basis may be biological, hormonal, or genetic, but it seems
increasingly probable that sexuality is hardwired.9 3 Beginning in the
1990s, D.F. Swaab found that a portion of a homosexual male's brain was
structurally different from a heterosexual brain.9 4  Other studies have
reported similar differences in homo- and heterosexual brain structures.
Twin studies96 and X-linked generational studies97 also suggest a biological
or genetic link.
Our fundamental understanding of homosexuality has increased
dramatically within the last few decades. While it must be conceded that
the debates within various fields are far from over, a major paradigm shift
has already occurred. Homosexuality is no longer solely viewed through
the grubby lens of unfounded, qualitative judgment. We increasingly avoid
the concept of a willful and deviant culpability, and have used the tools
from a variety of disciplines to understand homosexuality as a natural
sexual expression. As this brief summary can attest, a true fundamental
understanding has only recently come to light. The way we understand the
group-why individuals perform or are disposed to perform a course of
underlying conduct-has enormous implications on the resulting treatment
of that group, and provides a useful method to discern how our society
views the relationship between group and conduct.
B. A Political Voice
Our fundamental understanding of homosexuality can influence
societal views, but understanding is an insufficient indication that a group
is conceptualized independently from its defining conduct. Some form of
93. Id.
94. D.F. Swaab, Development of the Human Hypothalamus, 20 Neurochem Res. 509-19
(1995) (finding a difference between the size of the hypothalamus in heterosexual and
homosexual brains). See also D.F. Swaab, Sexual Differentiation of the Human Brain: Relevance
for Gender Identity, Transsexualism and Sexual Orientation, 19 GYNECOL. ENDOcRINOL. 301
(2004) ("Solid evidence for the importance ofpostnatal social factors is lacking.").
95. See, e.g., Laura S. Allen & Roger A. Gorski, Sexual Orientation and the Size of the
Anterior Commissure in the Human Brain, 89 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. USA 7199-202 (1992)
(finding a difference in the anterior commissure). Cf William Byne, Science and Belief
Psychobiological Research on Sexual Orientation, 28 J. HOMOSEX. 303-54 (1995) (expressing
doubt over the significance of brain size differences).
96. See, e.g., J. Michael Bailey & Richard C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual
Orientation, 48 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1089-96 (1991) (finding marked differences in
occurrences of homosexual orientation between monozygotic twins, dizygotic twins, and adoptive
brothers).
97. See, e.g., D.H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome
and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 Sci. 321-27 (1993) (finding larger numbers of homosexual
men in maternal lineages that possess certain markers on gene Xq28).
Summer 2012] 965
wider, societal acknowledgement is also necessary.9 8 The level of
acknowledgement need not be high or reach a level of pervasive
acceptance, as the Court has regularly struck down legislation that
infringed on rights of marginalized minority groups under rational-basis
review despite widespread disapproval. 99 All that is required is a low-
threshold indicator for public acknowledgement: the presence of a political
voice. The presence of a political voice suggests that the conduct-defined
group has begun to coalesce, meaning that group members may also
associate with one another for alternative political purposes. Group
cohesion typically increases and the conceptual separability between
conduct and group becomes increasingly apparent.
It was only in the latter half of the twentieth century that homosexuals
developed some form of political voice. In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, several influential figures began to articulate the view
that the prohibitions against homosexual conduct should be relaxed, 00 and
that homosexuality was a normal expression of human sexuality.'0 ' But
these early voices were those of physicians, philosophers, and lawyers
speaking in a professional capacity-voices from outside the group itself
One commentator has noted that "[u]nlike most other potentially
political groups, gay people are ... disempowered by virtue of being born
as if into a diaspora-probably randomly distributed about the population
at birth."l 02 In addition, homosexuals lack a mechanism for generational
transmission of identity.103  Thus, it comes as no surprise that the
development of homosexual communities occurred only slowly.1 04 In the
years prior to World War II, a few fleeting organized groups of
homosexuals existed, but they exerted little influence and proved to be
98. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 229 ("[C]ompletely powerless minorities [are rarely
protected]; instead, the Court tends to protect previously powerless groups once it has become
clear that the group is politically mobilized and potentially a partner in the pluralist system.").
99. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (homosexuals); U.S. Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (hippies); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (mentally handicapped); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children of illegal
immigrants).
100. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Offences Against One's Self in 3 J. Homosexuality 389-405
(Louis Crompton ed., 1978).
101. See, e.g., EDWARD CARPENTER, The Intermediate Sex (1912).
102. Kenneth Sherrill, Political Power of Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals, 29 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL., 469, 469 (1996). See also RICHARD POSNER, Sex and Reason 298-99 (1992).
103. Sherrill, supra note 102, at 469.
104. BAYER, supra note 75, at 70.
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short-lived.105 In the years after the war, things were not much changed.
Professor Eskridge argues:
The anonymity of homosexuals in the 1950's was key to their
political marginalization and contributed to antihomosexual
stereotypes; because folks did not realize that their friends and
relatives were gay, they were more likely to believe that
homosexuals were lonely, psychopathic, and dysfunctional. Closetry
disabled gay people from forming social and political groups and
thereb' enabled homophobes to persecute gay people virtually at
will.
After Kinsey published his research, more lasting homosexual groups
began forming.10 7 Several among them (notably the Mattachine Society in
1950 with its Mattachine Review, and the Daughters of Bilitis in 1953 with
its Ladder) began publication of journals,'08 which provided an early
platform in which various within-group viewpoints could be expressed.1 09
In the 1960s, homosexual groups became more politically active.110
Many groups shifted their focus from abstract theoretical interests to more
tangible goals of equality and acceptance."' Viewpoints began to coalesce
and political organization became possible, spurred on in part by the
grander civil rights movement. 112 But not until the 1969 Stonewall Riots
113did homosexual political activism emerged in any significant form.
Following a police raid on a gay bar in New York City's Greenwich
Village, a large-scale protest ensued, attracting nationwide attention and
providing a tipping point that facilitated a wider dissemination of a
homosexual political voice. 114
105. LAUD HUMPHREYS, Out of the Closets 50 (1972). The Society for Human Rights,
established in 1924 and disbanded only a few months later, is considered the first American
homosexual rights organization. DAVID BIANCO, Gay Essentials: Facts for Your Queer Brain 75
(1999).
106. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 306.
107. BAYER, supra note 75, at 69, 73.
108. Early homosexual journals often ran into trouble with obscenity laws. See, e.g., Roth v.
U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (homosexual publication ONE: The Homosexual Magazine held not to
have been obscene and entitled to First Amendment protection).
109. BAYER, supra note 75, at 73.
110. Id. at 81-82.
111. Id. at 82-84.
112. Id. at 88-89.
113. Id. at 92.
114. See David Carter, Stonewall: The Riots that Sparked the Gay Revolution (2004).
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The presence of a homosexual political voice gradually increased
during the 1970s, achieving the election and appointment of several openly
gay officials," as well as occasional legislative successes. But the
AIDS pandemic in the 1980s, and its early prevalence among homosexual
men, ushered in an enormous resurgence of political opposition." 7 Laws
and exclusionary administrative rules followed," coupled with a new
wave of public antipathy." 9 The AIDS pandemic served to decrease
drastically the level of political voice homosexuals had, as well as the basic
understanding of the group. The as-yet completely unknown disease and
its association with homosexuals suggested the realization that an
understanding of homosexuality could be deficient in some major way.
This forced society and the group itself to reexamine their attitudes towards
homosexuality,120 culminating in Bowers v. Hardwick,121 in which the
Court upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy statute in 1986. Nonetheless, there
were still some legal and political successes.122
115. Kathy Kozachenko to the Ann Arbor, Michigan City Council in 1974, Elaine Noble to
the Massachusetts Legislature in 1975, Harvey Milk to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in
1978, and Hon. Stephen Lachs to the Los Angeles County Superior Court in 1979.
116. E.g., the defeat of Proposition 6 in California ("the Briggs initiative") in 1978, which
would have made it mandatory to fire any public school employee who was either homosexual, or
who supported homosexual rights; the establishment of anti-discrimination laws such as the
Aspen, Colorado ordinance, which was the subject of Romer v. Evans. ASPEN, COLO., MUN.
CODE § 13-98 (1977) (cited in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996)). See also Robinson v.
Shapp, 350 A.2d. 464 (Penn. 1976) (governor's executive order directing state agencies not to
discriminate based on sexual preference held to be beyond jurisdiction of the judiciary, absent
proof it was otherwise contrary to law). Cf Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 24
Cal. 3d 458 (1979) (California's Fair Employment Practice Act does not encompass
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); Macauley v. Judicial Court of Mass., 397
N.E.2d 670 (Mass. 1979) (Massachusetts's employment antidiscrimination law held to not
include discrimination based on homosexuality), superseded by statute, 27 Mass. L. Rep. 254
(2010).
117. BAYER, supra note 75, at 197-200.
118. See, e.g., id at 201 (Public Health Service excluded homosexual men from blood donor
pool). See also Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707
(Wisc. Ct. App. 1991) (struck down school district policy of placing staff members who acquired
AIDS on mandatory sick leave or leave of absence); Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for
Dependent Children v. New York, 482 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 1985) (invalidated the Mayor of New
York City's executive order that prohibited discrimination by city contractors on the basis of
sexual orientation); Hinman v. Dep't of Pers. Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516 (1985) (denial of
dental benefits under State Employees' Dental Care Act upheld).
119. BAYER, supra note 75 at 205.
120. Id.
121. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
122. See, e.g., the other two anti-discrimination ordinances at issue in Romer v. Evans:
BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987); DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE
art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991) (cited in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996)). See also
Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289 (1984) (Los Angeles municipal ordinance precluding
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As understanding of the AIDS virus increased and the methods of its
sexual transmission were finally discovered,12 3 a homosexual political
presence was once again waxing in the 1990s. But homosexual political
influence was still tepid. One commentator remarked in 1996 that
homosexuals "are outnumbered and despised. . . . Their quest for political
power is disadvantaged by barriers to the formation of political community
as well as by lack of access to significant power resources."1 24 And while
inroads were made in anti-discrimination legislation, 12 5  other anti-
homosexual legislation, federal and state, was also on the rise.1 2 6
Particularly noteworthy examples include the "Defense of Marriage
Act,"l 27 "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 2 8 and Colorado's "Amendment 2" (a
state constitutional amendment that repealed all existing anti-discrimination
ordinances and precluded any future action designed to protect
homosexuals, later invalidated in Romer v. Evans).12 9  In the years
discrimination in business practices held to prevent restaurant from refusing a lesbian couple
service); Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1 (1982) (held that landlord cannot refuse to
rent an apartment because of a tenant's sexual preference under California's Unruh Act); People
v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980) (struck down New York's criminal prohibition on homosexual
sodomy); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-8 1 c (West 1991) (prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation for employment).
123. See, e.g., Doe v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 624 A.2d 440 (D.C. 1993)
(distinguishing between discrimination based on sexual orientation and on a perceived handicap
as an HIV carrier).
124. Sherrill, supra note 102, at 469.
125. See, e.g., Nacinovich v. Tullett & Tokyo Forex, Inc., 257 A.D.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation was viable under City
Human Rights Law, but not under State Human Rights Law); Howard Univ. v. Green 652 A.2d
41 (D.C. 1994) (citing D.C. CODE § 1-2512 (1981)) (D.C. Human Rights Act's sexual orientation
provision meant to ensure that homosexuals enjoy equal rights previously denied to them); Exec.
Order No. 13087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30097 (June 2, 1998).
126. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. §7 (1996) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) ("the Defense of Marriage
Act"); 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993) ("Don't Ask, Don't Tell") (repealed 2010). See also Flynn v.
Hillard, 707 N.E.2d 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (Illinois's Human Rights Act did not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation); Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.
1998) (upheld referendum amendment to city charter that eliminated employee benefits for
domestic partners); Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, The State Univ., 689 A.2d
828 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination does not bar denial of
health benefits to same-sex domestic partners); City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga.
1995) (upheld invalidation of jail registry and employee benefit ordinances that prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation); Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health & Hosp., 883 P.2d
516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (Career Service Authority Rule doesn't prohibit denial of sick leave
benefits on the basis of sexual orientation); Barbour v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 497 N.W.2d 216
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (discrimination based on sexual orientation was not proscribed by
Michigan Civil Rights Act).
127. 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
128. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed 2010).
129. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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immediately preceding the Lawrence decision, opinions differed as to the
level of political influence homosexuals exerted, but some level of political
organization was apparent.130
A political voice is a distinctive feature of conduct-defined groups not
because it allows a platform from which the group can advance its conduct-
related goals, but rather because political activity requires that the group
organize and gain depth as it considers issues incidental to and even
beyond the regulation of the group's underlying conduct, enabling it to
become a "potential[] partner in the pluralist system." 13 ' Issues incidental
to the regulation of the conduct are taken up, and as the group's political
voice solidifies, the group may evolve to confront tertiary issues that may
be only indirectly or entirely unrelated to the regulation of the group's
underlying conduct. Homosexual political influences have waxed and
waned, but one thing remains clear from an examination of a brief history
of the group's involvement in politics: Homosexuals have established a
political voice that was far from insignificant by the time the Lawrence
Court reexamined the issue in 2003. Treatment of conduct-defined groups
has certainly been influenced by whether they are nominal participants in
our political system; those that have been able to provide some degree of
influence and context, further distancing the group from a mere label used
to define a course of conduct.
C. Subculture and Group-Identity
The last major feature of a group that exists beyond the confines of a
defining conduct is the emergence of a subculture and group identity. As
additional identifying features and secondary characteristics of the group
begin to emerge, the group steps further beyond the core defining conduct.
The development of subculture and identity indicate that the conduct-
defined group has begun to coalesce around cognitive aspects of status,
rather than remain a synonym for conduct.13 2
Homosexual identity has been referred to as "an umbrella concept that
brings together many elements and categories that are contingently and
historically (as opposed to analytically or inherently) related."13 3 This last
factor is often the easiest to analyze, and from the historical discussion
130. Compare Sherrill, supra note 102, at 469 (emphasizing the "relative political
powerlessness" of homosexuals), with Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
homosexuals as "a politically powerful minority").
131. ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at 229.
132. Id. at 236-37.
133. Craig J. Konnoth, Created in Its Image: The Race Analogy, Gay Identity, and Gay
Litigation in the 1950s-1970s, 119 YALE L.J. 316, 324 (2009) (citing DAVID M. HALPERIN, How
to Do the History of Homosexuality 109 (2002)).
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above, the emergence of a homosexual subculture and identity seems
almost inevitable. One aspect, however, bears additional discussion:
distinguishing the construction of homosexual identity by internal and
external pressures.
Early homosexual identity was almost entirely constructed
externally-that is, by society at large. Already in the late nineteenth
century, perceived stereotypical characteristics were quite common. This
should come as no surprise because early homosexual identity was a
branded grouping. 134  Stereotyping was commonly used as a method of
identifying features by proponents of gender inversion.' 35 According to
this theory, homosexuality inverted the sexual role, which resulted in the
expectation that homosexuals would "perform[] acts and feel[] emotions
that were regarded by society as exclusively the domain of the other
gender."136 This kind of stereotyping was quite common primarily because
up until the civil rights movement in the 1960s, the group itself made no
serious or widespread efforts to establish a counter-viewpoint. 3 7
Perceived effeminacy in homosexual men (and the inverse in
homosexual women) has been suggested as the most prominent secondary
characteristic, 138 other behaviors, interests, and demeanors have also been
associated with the group.139  For example, Judge Posner suggests that
homosexuals may possess disproportionate artistic creativity,14 0 and David
Halperin suggests that passivity is among the primary set of elements that
comprises homosexual identity.141 Other commonly attributed
accompanying aspects include physical weakness, promiscuity, gravitation
towards certain occupations, concern with external appearance, above-
average incomes and education, and narcissism.14 2 Suffice it to say that
134. Konnoth, supra note 133, at 337.
135. Hermann, supra note 80, at 509.
136. Id. at 503-04.
137. Konnoth, supra note 133, at 327-28 (Because "'gay life... was collectively...
organized around stigma' prior to the homophile movement, it was only later that homosexuals
were able to "take a hand in producing their own identity categories to replace old ones.")
(quoting DANA ROSENFELD, The Changing of the Guard: Lesbian and Gay Elders, Identity, and
Social Change 63 (2003)).
138. See POSNER, supra note 102, at 301 (recognizing effeminacy in homosexual men, but
expressing doubt that it is an artifact of social control).
139. Id. at 300-02.
140. Id at 304.
141. DAVID M. HALPERIN, How to Do the History of Homosexuality 123 (2002).
142. POSNER, supra note 102, at 300-01. See also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645-46
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (homosexuals reside in disproportionate numbers in certain
communities, have. a high disposable income, and possess political power). Many of these
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external perceptions of homosexuals from across the last century have
flourished.
As part of a wider movement that pushed the reexamination of human
sexuality in the 1960s, homosexuals began a process of redefining
homosexual identity. While older, more stigmatized associations endured,
newer forms of homosexual identity began to emerge, notable because they
largely developed internally, that is, by homosexual subgroups
themselves.14 3 Homosexual identity underwent another significant change
during the AIDS pandemic, propelled by internal and external forces, as
backlash from fears about AIDSl44 forced homosexuals to confront new
misconceptions and a resurgence of negative external attention.145
At the turn of the century, shortly before Lawrence was decided,
homosexual subculture and identity were unquestionably corporeal.14 6 By
then, homosexual social and political groups had developed into fairly
large homosexual communities and fostered a subculture.147 Homosexual
identity possesses a longer history, nuanced by the influence of both
external and internal pressures, but was likewise firmly established. A
cognitive-based status component arises with the development of a
subculture and identity, which-like a fundamental understanding and
political voice-helps distance the conduct-based group from its
underlying conduct and alter how the group is then treated.
Homosexuals possess all three features of a conceptually distinct
conduct-defined group (fundamental understanding, political voice, and
subculture and identity), and with each factor, illustrate that even though
the group is defined by conduct at bottom, it has evolved well beyond.
"Homosexuals" is not a mere label for those who engage in homosexual
conduct. Rather, the group is far more vivid, and defies categorization
based merely on underlying conduct. As such, the Court was prudent to
grant the group special consideration and take into account that regulation
characteristics are exclusive to homosexual men. Cf POSNER, supra note 102, at 300 (noting that
society exerts much less pressure against lesbianism than against male homosexuality).
143. See, e.g., Konnoth, supra note 133, at 327-28 (detailing how homosexual identity
changed as a result of the African-American civil rights movement in the 1960s).
144. DIDI HERMAN, The Antigay Agenda: Orthodox Vision and the Christian Right 194-95
(1997) (arguing that while it may not be ill-fitting to characterize sentiment against homosexuals
in the mid-1980s as a "backlash", many anti-gay developments were "being spearheaded by a
social movement with a long history and a clear vision").
145. BAYER, supra note 75, at 199-200.
146. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 102, at 293 (recognizing and using nomenclature preferred
by the "homosexual subculture").
147. Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 98, 104-05 (2002)
(recognizing the definitive emergence of a discrete homosexual subculture by the time Bowers v.
Hardwick was brought to the Court in 1986).
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of a group's underlying conduct had negative effects on the group itself.
This holds true in the Court's other cases involving conduct-defined
groups. Two additional examples will aid in the understanding of the
contours of this framework.
IV. Other Conduct-Defined Groups
Treatment of homosexuals under rational-basis review is consistent
with how the Court has dealt with other conduct-defined groups. Groups
that exist beyond their underlying conduct are consistently afforded greater
concern than groups that do not. In this section, two other conduct-defined
groups will be similarly examined: hippies and physicians who assist
suicides. An analysis using the proposed three-factor test reveals that the
former possesses a fundamental understanding, political voice, and
subculture and identity, while the latter does not. As this test predicts, the
Court considered potential adverse effects on hippies, and declined to do so
when the conduct-defined group consisted of physicians who assist suicide.
A. Hippies
Hippies-the countercultural group that emerged during the mid-
1960s-became a targeted group under section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act
of 1964, as amended in 1971, which excluded any household containing
two or more unrelated members from participation in the federal food
stamps program.148 Legislative history reveals that Congress created the
amendment to "prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from
participating." 49 In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
the Court held that the law "cannot be sustained by reference to this
congressional purpose."150 With a sweeping statement that was cited by the
Lawrence Court a quarter century later, the Court opined that "a bare ...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest."' 5'
Hippies emerged in the early 1960s as a "cultural protest',152 of a
young generation. This counterculture movement was based on a brand of
philosophy but quickly evolved into a wholly new subculture,'53 espousing
148. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973); Food Stamp Act of 1964 §
3(e), 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (amended 1971).
149. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. E.D. HIRSCH, The Dictionary of Cultural Literacy 419 (1993).
153. Youth: The Hippies, TIME MAG., July 7, 1967, available at www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,899555-1,00.html.
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pacifism, free love, communal living, and drug use; and rejecting capitalist
economics. 154 The subculture spawned "an almost childlike fascination in
beads, blossoms, and bells, blinding strobe lights and ear-shattering music,
exotic clothing and erotic slogans."'s A distinctive subculture was present
soon after the group's inception, and began to identify with different
qualities and values in subsequent years.
A hippie political voice primarily espoused pacifism and was most
clearly raised against the Vietnam War.15 6 Hippies participated in non-
violent demonstrations, the organization of political action groups,
opposition to the draft, and refusal to serve in the military. 57
By 1973, hippies were fundamentally understood. In the first few
years, a general confusion over the aims and makeup of the group was
evident. 58 Viewpoints often differed:
One sociologist calls them "the Freudian proletariat." Another
observer sees them as "expatriates living on our shores but beyond
our society." Historian Arnold Toynbee describes them as "a red
warning light for the American way of life." For California's Bishop
James Pike, they evoke the early Christians: "There is something
about the temper and quality of these people, a gentleness, a
quietness, an interest-something good." To their deeply worried
parents throughout the country, they seem more like dangerously
deluded dropouts, candidates for a very sound spanking and a cram
course in civics-if only they would return home to receive either.' 59
Understanding of hippies gradually increased as it became clearer
what values and lifestyle the hippie subculture espoused, but in the mid-
1970s and 1980s many hippies began a process of reintegration into
mainstream society.16 0
Hippies as a group were originally defined by countercultural conduct
that followed a brand of philosophy,' 6 ' but it became quickly apparent that
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. DETLEF JUNKER ET AL., The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War,
1945-1990, at 424 (2004).
157. Id.
158. See Herb Caen, Small Thoughts at Large, S.F. Chron. June 25, 1967, at R-37, available
at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgif-/c/a/2009/05/31/PK6016S108.DTL.
159. Youth: The Hippies, supra note 153.
160. DON LATrIN, Following Our Bliss: How the Spiritual Ideals of the Sixties Shape Our
lives Today 74 (2004).
161. Youth: The Hippies, supra note 153 (hippie philosophy credits philosophers such as
Diogenes of Sinope, and the Greek Cynics, as well as religious leaders such as Jesus Christ, Hillel
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the conduct-defined group took on an independent vivacity that surpassed
the underlying conduct. All three factors-understanding, political voice,
and subculture and identity-are present. As such, the Court in Moreno
recognized that the adverse effect on hippies, as a group, was relevant to
the legitimacy of the state's interest under rational-basis review, which
ultimately led the Court to conclude that the government could not seek to
exclude hippie communes from a federal aid program.' 6 2
B. Assisted Suicide
The issue of physician-assisted suicide reached the Court in
Washington v. Glucksbergl6 3 in. 1997. Four physicians brought a
substantive due process challenge against Washington's ban on "caus[ing]
or aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide."' 64  Like the ban on
homosexual conduct in Lawrence and the denial of benefits to those living
in a hippie commune in Moreno, the State enacted a ban on a course of
conduct-assisting another person in a suicide attempt. The conduct-
defined group consists of physicians who providedl 65 that service. As we
shall see, this group lacks all three of the factors that distinguish a conduct-
defined group that exists beyond the course of conduct.
First, society lacks a basic understanding of the group. This is facially
evident in the Glucksberg majority opinion, which focuses exclusively on
the patients and contains almost no reference to the attending physicians.
The Court found that Washington had three legitimate state interests: the
"fear that permitting assisted suicide will start [the state] down the path to
voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia," 6 6 the protection of
"vulnerable groups-including the poor, elderly, and disabled persons-
from abuse, neglect, and mistakes,"1 67 and "an unqualified interest in the
the Elder, Buddha, Mazdak, St. Francis of Assisi, Henry David Thoreau, and Gandhi, and even
literary figures such as Aldous Huxley and J.R.R. Tolkien).
162. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973).
163. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
164. Id. at 707; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (2011).
165. To be precise, the physicians challenging Washington's law in Glucksberg were
"doctors [who] occasionally treat[ed] terminally ill, suffering patients, and declareld] that they
would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for Washington's assisted-suicide ban," and
not doctors who had already been engaged in assisting suicides. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707.
166. Id. at 732-33. Euthanasia differs from assisted suicide by who acts to end the patient's
life. In assisted suicide, the patient self-administers a lethal medication, but in euthanasia, a third
party acts to directly end the patient's life. ETHICS INMEDICINE: PHYSICIANAID-IN-DYING, UNIV.
OF WASH. SCH. OF MED., http://depts.washington.edu/
bioethx/topics/pad.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
167. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
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preservation of human life."l 68 The Court's underlying concern lies with
"the real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life
situations,"' 69 but does not expressly mention the attending physicians or
the medical profession in general.170
The group also lacks a political voice. While the medical community
at large may possess a great deal of political clout, the conduct-defined
group (which is distinguishable) does not. The debate surrounding assisted
suicide has been shaped by both physicians and laypersons. However,
neither the group itself nor the medical community at large has expressed a
strong unifying opinion on this issue. Examples like that of Dr.
Kevorkianl 7 1 can be found, but are atypical and should not be considered
representative of the group. 172 Surveys of individual physicians show that
roughly half believe that physician-assisted suicide is "ethically justifiable
in certain cases,"173 but professional organizations such as the American
Medical Association, the American Nurses Association, and the American
Psychiatric Association have "generally argued against [it] on the grounds
that it undermines the integrity of the profession." 74 The practice is only
now legal in three states: Oregon,175 Montana,17 6 and Washington. 17 7
Finally, the group also lacks a subculture and identity. The medical
community has reached a consensus on two central principles: "Physicians
have an obligation to relieve pain and suffering and to promote the dignity
of dying patients in their care," 7 8 and "[t]he principle of patient bodily
integrity requires that physicians must respect patients' competent
decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment." 79  Even though these
168. Id. at 728.
169. Id. at 732.
170. The Court's only substantive reference to the medical profession is a study on the
practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. Id. at 734.
171. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
172. The group encompasses a much wider portion of the medical community; surveys
indicate that about one in five practicing physicians will receive a request for physician-assisted
suicide at some point in their career. Ethics in Medicine: Physician Aid-in-Dying, supra note
166.
173. Id
174. Id. See also Brief of the American Medical Ass'n, the American Nurses Ass'n, and the
American Psychiatric Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (No. 96-110).
175. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800-995 (1994) (Oregon's "Death with Dignity Act").
176. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
177. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245 (2008) (Washington's "Death with Dignity Act").
178. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE, NORTHWESTERN UNIV., http://endoflife.
northwestern.edu/physician assisted suicide-debate/what.cfhm (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
179. Id
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principles have particular bearing on this issue, physician-assisted suicide
is not qualitatively different from other areas of medical practice. There is
no substantive distinction between physicians who assist suicides and those
who do not. While dealing with a request for hastened death requires a
high degree of prudence from a physician, caution has been given against
divorcing it from alternative palliative medicine, and nothing indicates that
a physician's duties regarding physician-assisted suicide involve a marked
difference in the standard of care.'8 0
The group identified by the act of physician-assisted suicide lacks all
three indicators, and cannot be said to exist beyond the confines of the
underlying course of conduct. The Court thus did not consider adverse
impact, and ultimately refused to invalidate Washington's ban on
physician-assisted suicide under rational-basis review.' 8 1
Conclusion
Once conduct-defined groups have drifted from their conduct-defined
mooring, they are given greater protection under substantive due process'
rational-basis review, most clearly visible as explicit concern over possible
adverse impact on the group. A basic understanding, a political voice, and
a subculture and identity are three crucial features that this Note has
identified as indicators for when a group originally defined by a course of
conduct has evolved, and thus, receives special consideration.
These groups have received two forms of treatment under rational-
basis review. This comes as no surprise, given the nature of tiered review
and the proliferation of standards under the banner of "tiered review." On
close examination, it is apparent that some conduct-defined groups receive
special consideration-concern over potential adverse impact on the
group-whereas others do not. Groups that have received this form of
heightened treatment are readily distinguishable. Hippies and homosexuals
qualify, while physicians who assist suicides do not.
This framework distinguishing among conduct-defined groups can
apply to cases beyond substantive due process, and is germane to the level
of deference given to groups in other constitutional playgrounds-notably
the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment. With respect to the
First Amendment, conduct like ritual animal sacrifice for religious
purposes gives rise to conduct-defined groups of religious sects.18 2 Turning
to Equal Protection, illegally immigrating to this country as a child with
180. Id.
181. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
182. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(decided under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause).
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one's parents results in a groups that consists of undocumented alien
children.183  Both of these groups were targeted by conduct bans (from
animal sacrifice and public education, respectively), and existed beyond the
defining course of conduct. The Court in each case explicitly considered
what adverse impacts of the ban on conduct had on each group, and
ultimately struck both state laws down.
In contrast, committing a felony and dancing nude in an adult theater
are both conduct that give rise to different groups: felons' 84 and nude
dancers,185 respectively. These groups were the subject of similar, targeted
conduct bans (on felons' ability to vote and nude dancing), but received
different treatment-these groups never emerged beyond the defining
course of conduct. The Court upheld these bans without reference to the
impact these bans had on the group of individuals that engaged in the
underlying conduct.
The Court's treatment of conduct-defined groups has often been
implied; careful judges and able lawyers craft their language to shift the
focus from conduct to group, or vice versa. But this simple dichotomy is
ultimately misplaced. The relationship between a course of conduct and a
conduct-defined group is nuanced, and requires careful examination. The
Court has long afforded some conduct-defined groups special consideration
by weighing the adverse effects on the corresponding group, but, it has
withheld these special considerations for other groups, all under the banner
of rational-basis review. Justice Marshall correctly noted that "[a]ll
interests not 'fundamental' . . . are not the same,"' 8 6 and the Court certainly
does not pretend that they are. The Court's consideration of different
conduct-defined groups is far from arbitrary; a principled distinction has
emerged, despite the obfuscating effect of tiered review.
183. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (decided under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause).
184. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (decided under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause).
185. Barnes v. Glen Theaters, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (decided under the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause).
186. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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